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Abstract 
 
Scathing critiques of the Food and Drug Administration's (“FDA”) performance by the Government 
Accountability Office and Institutes of Medicine, a plummet in innovative new drug approvals in spite of 
significant annual investment increases in biopharmaceutical research and development (“R&D”), and 
market controversies such as the painkiller Vioxx and the diabetes drug Avandia (both associated with 
significantly escalated risks of heart attacks and strokes) have raised doubts about the sufficiency of FDA 
*364 regulation. This Article questions how prescription medicines reach the market and proposes law-
policy reforms to enhance the FDA's science standard for human clinical trials and new drug approvals. 
The core message is that relying too heavily on clinical research data generated through the global “gold 
standard” of group experimental design--reliance on statistical analysis to compile and compare group 
averages--risks predicting little about the actual impact of prescription medicines on individuals, 
including members of the groups under study. This Article introduces a law-policy methodology based 
upon commercial incentives and intervention by Congress and the FDA to raise the science standard for 
human clinical research, and to make drug development more closely parallel the reality of drug delivery 
in the practice of medicine. The objectives of this proposal are to promote several pressing needs: 
maximize drug performance and minimize adverse events; end the pattern of putting new prescription 
medications on the market with too much dependence on the medical profession to introduce 
meaningful clinical understanding of drugs through patient use over time; improve biopharmaceutical 
R&D decision making; align the regulatory standard with the infusion of added precision associated with 
contemporary genetics-based R&D; and realize more sound scientific information directly through the 
regulatory process to support the integrity of science in an age of academia-industry integration, 
aggressive commercialization, secrecy in science, and constantly, rapidly evolving technology. 
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*366 “2007 was the single worst year for new drug approvals in a quarter century and 2008 proved to 
be only slightly better.” [FN1] 
“[T]he drug industry's research productivity has been declining for 15 years, ‘and it certainly doesn't 
show any signs of turning upward’. . . .” [FN2] 
“At present, our best advice for anyone concerned with the pharmaceutical treatment of behavior 
disorders in people with developmental disabilities is simple: Be skeptical and collect data.” 
 Introduction 
 
“Emma will never speak” was the conclusion of health care professionals when she was assessed for 
significant learning disabilities at the age of three. [FN4] Confirming what her parents had suspected and 
feared for much of her life, these health care professionals diagnosed Emma with an autism spectrum 
disorder. [FN5] Autism or not, Emma's parents did not accept the notion that their *367 daughter would 
never speak, and especially the prognosis that nothing could be done to help her. They researched non-
stop and exploited every resource to find appropriate educational support. Their efforts led to entering 
Emma into a program staffed by teachers focusing on her particular situation and taking moment-to-
moment data on her responses, graphing and analyzing even minute components of her day. Teachers, 
working in close collaboration and constantly comparing and analyzing data, used the detailed 
information drawn from Emma and several other students clinically very similar to her to generate, 
implement, and test--individually and collectively--a litany of highly individualized interventions in an 
ongoing manner. Within a little more than one year, Emma acquired some functional speech, 
demonstrated learning at increasingly higher rates, showed IQ score improvements, and was 
successfully entered into a program that mainstreamed her with children developing according to 
“typical” indicators. The interventions--both successful and unsuccessful-- and accompanying, detailed 
data were derived from the tactics and strategies in the applied behavioral literature. Most of these 
interventions became the subject of a series of publications in the science literature to the benefit of 
other teachers, children, and the field in general. 
Emma's story illustrates the cumulative effect yielded from single subject research design (“SSRD”), 
which entails a systematic implementation of the scientific method to analyze and treat behavioral 
problems. [FN6] SSRD, a natural science methodology for human clinical research, developed in practice 
and has been addressed in literature for over a half a century in disciplines such as behavior analysis, 
education, physical therapy, and occupational therapy. [FN7] *368 With SSRD, evidence-based practices 
are identified vis-à-vis replication rather that the aggregate of results en masse. SSRD is an alternative to 
group experimental design (“GD”), the global “gold standard” for human clinical trial research in drug 
development. [FN8] GD is based in randomized, parallel, group trials. [FN9] While GD typically focuses 
on ascertaining statistically significant variations based upon group averages, [FN10] the core SSRD 
methodology is to repeat comparisons of control and treatment conditions with the same *369 
individual or staggered across similar individuals, graph the data on a subject-by-subject basis, and 
analyze the results. [FN11] Thus, the individual serves as her own control while the variables interacting 
between the individual and the environment are isolated. Such a finely grained approach enables the 
researcher to obtain valuable information about both the individual and the intervention, and more 
carefully police threatening complications. This research approach has not been utilized in drug 
development: “Although there is a long tradition of employing single subject designs in social science 
research, these designs have only recently been utilized in biomedicine.” [FN12] 
This Article proposes law-policy reform of human clinical trials in drug development to promote the use 
of SSRD. A primary, overarching goal is to advance the transition from traditional pharmaceutical R&D, 
with its focus on taking away symptoms, to actually treating the causes of disease--at the cellular, 
genetic, and molecular levels. [FN13] Specifically, the Article challenges *370 the FDA's extensive 
reliance on the GD model, which has governed clinical research since not too long after enactment of 
the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act in 1938, [FN14] and suggests law-policy reforms to increase SSRD 
studies in drug development. A major premise is that regulation of human clinical trials should be 
responsive to the governing science, and SSRD emphasizes the reality of human variability [FN15] in a 
manner in sync with contemporary genetic science and the actual practice of medicine. [FN16] The core 
message is that relying on data generated through GD alone--again, group averages compiled through 
statistical analysis to test hypotheses--risks predicting little about the actual impact of prescription 
medicines on individual patients at the detriment of ongoing and future drug development, to the loss 
of multiple tens of millions of living patients waiting for treatments, who are suffering from ongoing, 
seriously debilitating, and even life-threatening human health ailments. [FN17] Such *371 a reliance on 
this type of analysis may conceivably mask potentially effective treatments for individuals and life-
threatening complications for others. 
A major focus of discussion is the nexus between the regulation of drug development and the delivery of 
health care. Under the present law-policy scheme, drug review is too lenient, [FN18] practical yet 
sophisticated understanding of new pharmaceuticals is too limited, and market approval invites 
excessive off-label use--an approach that muddles clinical care with clinical research excessively, and 
exacerbates the unpredictability of prescription medications. [FN19] *372 Ultimately, the medical 
profession exercises expansive prescription discretion, on and off FDA-approved labels, to sort through 
the actual safety, efficacy, and peculiarities of a drug patient-by-patient, and over time--typically years--
after the drug is on the market. [FN20] As documented in one empirical study, “Off-label prescribing is 
very common in all areas of medicine. It is not uncommon for a drug to be prescribed more often off-
label than on-label. . . . Indeed, 80 percent to 90 percent of pediatric patient regimens involve at least 
one off-label prescription.” [FN21] Ironically, off-label usage has been common practice for individuals 
with developmental disabilities and autism, while some physicians do not always recognize applied 
behavior analysis as a validated treatment for autism due to the apparent dearth of large scale GD 
studies. [FN22] 
Congress has recognized and addressed the problem through sweeping legislation known as the Food 
and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (“FDAAA”). [FN23] The methodology of FDAAA is to 
“augment premarket clinical studies” and try to cull more from resulting data “with new sources of 
evidence about the risks and benefits of drugs,” but the Act does not change *373 reliance on GD as the 
gold standard in drug development. [FN24] Rather, the core methodology of FDAAA is to do more with 
GD--in essence, to rely on it more. [FN25] Continued over-reliance on GD in human clinical studies 
coupled with extensive medical community discretion to essentially experiment on patients without 
systematically contributing to the research base--as opposed to clinical researchers experimenting on 
research subjects under human subject protections and direct FDA oversight--threatens to perpetuate a 
crude working standard for prescription medications as they enter the market and for years thereafter. 
This regulatory approach is increasingly unacceptable in an age of genetic science. [FN26] 
This Article begins by profiling GD in human clinical trials--again, the so-called gold standard and the 
cornerstone of the law-policy rubric governing market approval for human medicinal products. [FN27] 
Tremendous reliance on GD has been reinforced globally through the International Conference on 
Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (“ICH”) 
standard sharing. [FN28] Part I then introduces SSRD in an interdisciplinary, comparative manner 
through discussion that draws from a debate over GD and SSRD in human clinical studies developed in 
another health care context--the field of applied behavior analysis (“ABA”). [FN29] Specifically, the 
Comprehensive Application of Behavior Analysis to Schooling Program (“CABAS®”) at Columbia 
University's Teachers College has utilized SSRD in research with and treatment of children with 
behavioral conditions and often severe learning disabilities, many labeled “autistic,” and, *374 more 
recently, neuro-typical children. [FN30] This is a highly protected group under the regulations to protect 
human subjects [FN31]--one that has been too often overlooked and avoided in clinical research for 
drug development and yet routinely prescribed medications that reach the market. [FN32] CABAS®, with 
a legacy of three decades of research and an international network of schools and graduates working in 
the field, has challenged the preexisting norms of heavy reliance on GD in clinical research and 
generated significant research accomplishments and documented treatment interventions. [FN33] In 
addition to the shared context of clinical research, treatment for patients with developmental 
disabilities depends heavily--arguably, often too heavily-- on utilization of prescription medicines made 
available through the drug development process without data sufficient for physicians to match drugs 
and patients. [FN34] These practices, in addition to raising cautionary concerns regarding unknown side 
effects, may also lead to an unsubstantiated yet alluring false efficacy. 
Part II frames ongoing disappointments and frustrations with contemporary drug development and 
challenges the entrenched reliance on GD. Specifically, this Part questions continued dependence upon 
mathematical abstracts that, although representative of the group collectively, may say nothing decisive 
about members of the group individually, let alone broad populations of patients with health care needs 
outside the group. The discussion concludes that the core regulatory process to put drugs on the market 
lingers from the past and is disconnected from the patient-centered nature of the practice of medicine 
and the science disciplines that dominate today's innovative biopharmaceutical R&D. Part III proposes a 
regulatory overhaul of clinical research to modify the gold standard through utilization of SSRD. This 
proposal draws from past efforts by Congress and the FDA to shape clinical trial research through both 
direct mandates and commercial incentives, *375 including the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act 
(“BPCA”) [FN35] and the Orphan Drug Act (“ODA”). [FN36] 
 
I. The “Gold Standard” in Human Clinical Research and the SSRD Alternative 
 
The following discussion summarizes the evolution of GD as the gold standard for clinical research and 
drug approval with a focus on the accompanying law-policy rubric that promotes it. [FN37] The 
discussion then profiles SSRD as an alternative natural science research methodology for human clinical 
research that, although increasingly recognized in biomedicine in recent years, remains highly 
underutilized in biopharmaceutical R&D. [FN38] 
 
A. The Science and Law-Policy Rubric for Human Clinical Research 
The law-policy surrounding human clinical trials reflects the regulatory role the FDA has evolved into 
during the decades after enactment of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (“FDCA”). [FN39] The 
FDCA bestowed the Agency with the powers to assume a market gatekeeper role--the authority to 
examine, question, and evaluate the clinical utility of drugs. [FN40] Still, prior to 1970, the Agency made 
law primarily by pursuing judicial enforcement of statutory standards. [FN41] Subsequently, the Agency 
has shifted in the direction of an administrative law-policy approach--exercising its capacity as product 
reviewer and rule-maker--and has raised the burden on drug sponsors to earn market approval. As 
observed by authors Hutt, Merrill, and Grossman, “Faced *376 with increasingly complex substantive 
issues and a growing number of firms making regulated products, FDA turned toward rulemaking as the 
principal technique for defining legal requirements. The agency attempted to resolve most of the major 
issues it confronted through administrative, rather than court, action.” [FN42] The FDA, as product 
reviewer and market gatekeeper, has been responsive to clinical trial data of effectiveness generated 
through implementation of the GD gold standard--randomized, parallel, group clinical trial designs. 
[FN43] The standard has been adopted globally, as recognized by the ICH in E9 Statistical Principles for 
Clinical Trials. The ICH issued E9 in 1998 to harmonize statistical methodologies used to support 
marketing applications. [FN44] The ICH serves as an advisory body for drug harmonization for the 
European Union (“EU”) through the European Medicines Agency (“EMA”), the United States through the 
FDA, and Japan through the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare. [FN45] In 2008, the ICH developed 
technical requirements for registration of pharmaceuticals for human use. [FN46] The requirements 
defined key terms in the discipline of pharmacogenomics, including pharmacogenetics, genomic 
biomarkers, and genomic data, and provided sample drug coding categories. [FN47] The intent was “to 
develop *377 harmonized approaches to drug regulation” and “to ensure that consistent definitions of 
terminology are being applied across all constituents of the [ICH],” as well as the “integration of the 
discipline of pharmacogenomics [(“PG”)] and pharmacogenetics into the global drug development and 
approval processes.” [FN48] In 2010, the ICH developed requirements for the context, structure, and 
format of voluntary biomarker submissions from PG research in order to create a “harmonized 
recommended structure for biomarker qualification” that will allow for consistency of applications and 
will “facilitate discussions with and among regulatory authorities.” [FN49] Between the three regulatory 
entities enveloped in the ICH, all three adhere to these standards, but at this point no standards have 
been developed to integrate PG into mainstream healthcare. 
The resulting quid pro quo for market access is data generated through GD in four phases (sometimes 
classified as five) of clinical trials. [FN50] Phase I trials generally are conducted in tens of healthy 
volunteers for up to a month with the objective of making the transition from animal to human 
participants through research on toxicity and a showing of safety. [FN51] Minimum doses are 
administered, and the healthy status of participants enhances the transparency of their impact. [FN52] 
With a focus on safety, the core objective of these trials is to assess the metabolic and pharmacological 
actions of the drug candidate in *378 humans, and to identify side effects while increasing doses. [FN53] 
Phase I trials also may garner early evidence of effectiveness. [FN54] Phase II trials involve hundreds of 
participants drawn from the target disease group and span several months. [FN55] The objectives are to 
study the effectiveness of the new treatment, to determine short-term side effects and overall risks 
associated with the drug, and to develop advanced dosage criteria. [FN56] Phase III typically 
encompasses thousands of disease group participants at multiple sites with the goals of balancing safety 
and efficacy, to refine dosage, and establish overall effectiveness against a placebo (sugar pill) or other 
control. [FN57] 
The data generated in Phase III shapes applications for market access. The baseline standard for market 
approval is to outperform a placebo on efficacy, perhaps just by a percentage point or two, with a 
showing of tolerable safety in a defined population. [FN58] Once biopharmaceuticals reach the market, 
the medical community has broad discretion to use them off-label--and does so aggressively. [FN59] The 
FDA continues to regulate pharmaceuticals post-market approval through Phase IV follow-on trials that 
probe lingering questions and strive to perfect clinical use, that is, to develop additional details about 
the product's safety and efficacy. [FN60] Congress has attempted to shift traditional *379 Phase IV trials 
into premarket studies through the FDAAA. [FN61] Phase IV studies have been largely observational and 
centered on post-marketing surveillance to detect and define previously unknown or inadequately 
quantified adverse reactions and related risk factors. [FN62] In recent years, these studies often have 
distinguished defined demographic groups that may have been overlooked as a focus point during the 
trials that put the drugs on the market. [FN63] Areas of inquiry may involve formulation evaluations, 
dosages, the durations of treatment, and interactions with other medications. [FN64] 
A major trend since implementation of the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 
(“FDAMA”) has been to err in favor of putting new drugs on the market on a watch-and-see basis to 
introduce access for patients in need, albeit conditioned with follow-on studies--often referred to as 
506B studies. [FN65] This approach is consistent with expansion of the FDA's mission under FDAMA to 
include efficiency, along with efficacy and safety, for new drug approvals. [FN66] Unfortunately, the FDA 
has been lax in enforcing these post-market study conditions. [FN67] 
*380 FDA regulations and standards for clinical trial study design distinguish exploratory trials from 
confirmatory trials and hold the former to more rigid standards. [FN68] With the most common study 
design, parallel group experimental design, participants are randomized to one or more trial arms, and 
each arm is allocated a different treatment. [FN69] Ideally for the purposes of generating and collecting 
data both for safety and efficacy, GD comparisons are drawn between a group of participants taking the 
drug candidate and another administered a placebo to show statistically significant differences between 
group mean scores. [FN70] Double-blinding (neither the administering physician nor the participants 
know who actually is receiving the drug candidate) is used to check the risk of bias. [FN71] However, in 
practice, it tends to be much more complicated to incorporate participants' access to existing 
treatments into the studies. Research subjects are administered the drug candidate coupled with an 
existing standard-of-care treatment. [FN72] Comparisons are made with groups *381 given the standard 
treatment alone or, where there are multiple treatment options, the drug candidate with varied 
couplings. [FN73] 
Since the introduction of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act in 1992 (“PDUFA”), the FDA has been 
granting accelerated approval of novel drugs based upon surrogate endpoints--laboratory measures that 
suggest improvements in patient health rather than factual documentation of actual impact given a 
contained timeframe--in accordance with formal clinical standards, meaning patient health 
improvements. [FN74] Inferences about the drug candidates are based on statistical comparisons of 
group mean scores. [FN75] The ultimate compilation is a statistical common denominator across the full 
target disease population. 
A major limitation in GD for drug development is that human variability among study participants may 
prove significantly more substantial than anticipated even though, symptomatically, the subjects appear 
to share what has been classified a disease. [FN76] The mathematical abstract derived from the 
population may predict nothing for any individual participant. As explained by Professor Janosky, 
[P]atients are unique and may not respond similarly to various treatments, and in those instances a 
randomized clinical trial design may be inappropriate. *382 Guidelines are established from the 
averaged study findings, which may not necessarily be applicable when evaluating suitable treatment 
options for individuals. Specifically, patients treated in primary care settings may differ clinically from 
patients in the clinical trial, the patient diversity in the clinical trial may not generalize to certain patient 
populations, and the stringent trial criteria for accepting participants may not accurately reflect general 
patient populations. [FN77] 
The effort to account for human variability and to generate a meaningful predictor of drug performance 
through GD, to the extent that is possible, demands thousands of participants at multiple locations--a 
need that has increased substantially over the last decade and pushed drug sponsors to outsource both 
toxicology studies and human clinical trials to contract research organizations (“CRO”). [FN78] “In the 
past, a single phase three trial might have needed 3,000 patients and cost between $10 million and $20 
million. Today, the same kind of study would take 20,000 patients and cost $50 million to $100 million . . 
. .” [FN79] While the trend is expansion of clinical trial recruitment outside of the U.S. borders, [FN80] 
“[t]he number of clinical trials in the United States has climbed dramatically in recent years. Between 
2000 and 2006, *383 clinical trials increased from 40,000 to 59,000--a nearly 50 percent jump.” [FN81] 
Though industry is spending unprecedented amounts on clinical research and conducting more and 
larger clinical trials, the sobering outcome is a steep drop in innovative new drug approvals in recent 
years. [FN82] 
Congress has recognized and responded to the drug development dilemma by forcing more of GD 
through the FDAAA and culling more data around it rather than questioning the methodology. [FN83] 
The current administration is concerned enough to introduce a billion-dollar center, funded in a time of 
economic trouble, to infuse government-performed research assistance in order to help industry put 
more new drugs on pharmacy shelves. [FN84] 
 
B. The Advent and Evolution of SSRD 
SSRD is a natural science research methodology developed in practice and addressed in literature for 
over a half a century in disciplines such as behavior analysis, education, physical therapy, and 
occupational therapy. [FN85] “Although there is a long tradition of employing single subject designs in 
social science research, these designs have only recently been utilized in biomedicine,” [FN86] and 
“these methods have been used infrequently in clinical psychopharmacology.” [FN87] However, the 
cross-discipline popularity of SSRD is on the rise: “In recent literature, it appears these designs are 
receiving more recognition, as they are being increasingly employed in research across disciplines.” 
[FN88] 
The core SSRD methodology is to repeat comparisons of control and treatment conditions with the same 
individual or staggered across similar individuals, graph the data on a subject-by-subject basis, and then 
analyze the resulting data. [FN89] 
*384 Single-case design experiments to evaluate treatment effects involve directly observing and 
measuring one or more specific behaviors of an individual repeatedly for a period of time while a 
particular treatment is not in place (the control or baseline condition), and while it is (the experimental 
or treatment condition). . . . Comparisons of control and treatment conditions are repeated, or 
replicated, with the same individual and/or with other similar individuals. [FN90] 
Human variability is accounted for in single subject research by manipulating environmental variables 
that occasion steady states of responding--rather using statistical analysis to herd subjects into what are 
declared to be steady states for the individual, but actually represent only group averages. Specifically, 
In applied single-case studies, the interest is not in statistically significant differences between group 
mean scores but in clinically and educationally important improvements in individual behavior in 
comparison to baseline. In many behavior analytic studies, those changes--that is, differences in data 
from the control and treatment conditions--far exceed what is required for statistical significance. 
Individual differences in responses to treatment and variability in behavior are not viewed as “noise” to 
be wiped out mathematically, but as natural features of behavior to be studied further so they can be 
better understood. Replication, which is an essential ingredient of science, is built into single-case 
designs. . . . The evidence for those conclusions comes from conditions where the treatment and other 
variables are tightly controlled and the effects of the treatment on behavior are observed directly, 
rather than from statistical transformations of numbers that do not represent actual behavior. [FN91] 
The SSRD and GD methodologies for responding to variability in outcomes are fundamentally different. 
[FN92] In GD, researchers typically use large samples to average out differences in outcomes, while 
SSRD researchers attempt to bring outcome differences under experimental control--in other words, 
statistical control over error through large samples under GD, versus experimental control to reduce 
error with a heightened focus on individual subject responses under SSRD. [FN93] As pointed out by 
Professor Janosky, 
[The GD] strategy is problematic for two reasons: (1) statistical power and sample size are related, with 
larger samples at times leading to significant but very small effects with little pragmatic value and (2) it 
discourages the researcher from strategically modifying treatment (i.e., response guided 
experimentation) that may positively impact most if not all the patients. [FN94] 
*385 In contrast, under SSRD, patient responsiveness is probed through modification of, and changes in, 
the treatment as a consequence of response-guided experimentation. [FN95] 
Ultimately, the objective driving drug development must be the improvement of patient health. The 
medical community effectively engages in a simulation of SSRD through often creative patient-by-
patient treatment with biopharmaceuticals under its discretion to use them off-label--a “cart before the 
horse approach” so to speak. In the words of some thoughtful observers, “[t]o some extent, clinical 
medicine always has been tailored to the patient in that each physician-patient relationship is unique, 
and each clinical encounter represents the physician's attempt to provide the optimal care to the 
patient in the examining room, the emergency room, the hospital bed, and the intensive care unit.” 
[FN96] 
SSRD's focus on the individual has made the methodology a natural fit for the field of behavior analysis. 
[FN97] In fact, much of the groundwork is attributable to B.F. Skinner and dates back to the 1930s: 
Skinner emphasized studying the individual to determine lawful models of behavior. He drew heavily 
upon animal research, often using pigeons or rats, to uncover fundamental learning principles that could 
then be applied to humans. Inevitably, similar procedures for modifying behavior were applied to 
individual human subjects. Within the realm of applied behavior analysis, single subject design studies 
began examining methods for modifying behavior of individuals with diverse psychological problems, 
including stuttering, learning disabilities, mental retardation, and psychotic symptoms. [FN98] 
SSRD has had a profound impact in the treatment of individuals with autism spectrum disorder and 
other severe learning disabilities. [FN99] For example, the CABAS® model, a comprehensive approach to 
behavior analysis and schooling, [FN100] has yielded an abundance of procedures, tactics, interventions, 
and large scale protocols for parents, educators, and children with a wide *386 variety of disabling 
conditions. [FN101] The underlying theme of all CABAS® research is adhering to scientific rigor based on 
John Stuart Mill's five canons of the scientific method. [FN102] Through tightly controlled scientific 
studies conducted by practitioners, CABAS® research has promoted the growth and development of 
academic social repertoires for children, and generally enabled learning and function in thousands of 
children deemed “unteachable.” [FN103] While education is a field susceptible to trends, untestable 
theories, and heavy reliance on construct attributes, SSRD has allowed the field of behavior analysis to 
establish grounded, effective approaches and documented success with severely learning-disabled 
children through natural science evaluation in human clinical research. Interestingly, while SSRD 
methods have been developed through and used significantly in ABA, they have been used infrequently 
in clinical psychopharmacology. 
II. Drug UnderDEVELOPMENT 
 
Throughout much of the twentieth century and into the present one, pharmaceutical research and 
development (“R&D”) has been the most profitable sector. [FN105] For decades, our tendency as 
patients and consumers has been to believe that prescription medications improve human health and, 
in turn, to associate medicine closely with science--especially when grappling with a seriously 
debilitating illness. [FN106] There have been profound improvements to human health through 
pharmaceuticals for well over a half century, [FN107] but the overall reality is that the prescription 
medication arsenal to treat all human ailments prior to the 1990s consisted of merely 2000-3000 
commercial pharmaceuticals derived from 483 drug targets (compounds that serve as the basis for 
medicinal applications). [FN108] 
 
*387 A. The Twentieth Century Drug Development Experience 
The crudeness of the underlying science relied upon is self-evident in the twentieth century drug 
development experience. Historically, developers would sort through thousands of drug targets to 
produce just one pharmaceutical success. [FN109] The endeavor focused on taking away the symptoms 
of disease--not on understanding and treating the causes of disease. [FN110] “[D]rug discovery 
essentially was a linear process based upon screening and testing of thousands of chemicals and natural 
substances for potential therapeutic activity. Screening was time consuming and largely random 
because drug targets and drug functions were in most cases unknown.” [FN111] Compounds were 
introduced in living organisms to identify their effect and potential medicinal utilities, purified to control 
toxicity in conjunction with at least one medicinal use, and introduced onto the market with the 
expectation that physicians would experiment further while practicing medicine on patients and identify 
additional clinical utilities through off-label uses. [FN112] 
Drug sponsors were not even required to demonstrate efficacy for market access until 1962. [FN113] 
The regulatory standard for market approval of a drug candidate in the United States has been 
eliminating symptoms, even if just marginally more effectively than a placebo, coupled with a showing 
that adverse events and other safety issues across the target disease population are tolerable given the 
benefits. [FN114] This standard, paired with the discretion of *388 commercial sponsors to tailor clinical 
research and to apply (or not) for approval of specific uses in applications for market access, has invited 
tremendous off-label use by the U.S. medical profession once products reach the market. [FN115] 
Though the biopharmaceutical sectors spend tens of billions of dollars on research annually, [FN116] 
they spend more on marketing--both legal and illegal. [FN117] Much of their marketing is directed at 
encouraging the medical community to exercise its discretion to use their products off-label. [FN118] 
Off-label use is motivated further by publication of industry-sponsored research in science and medical 
journals, direct-to-consumer marketing, [FN119] and patient faith in new treatments, including 
experimental ones. [FN120] Even when marketed legally, only “[o]ne-third of all drugs act as expected 
when prescribed to patients,” and there are approximately two million adverse drug reactions requiring 
hospitalization each year. [FN121] Adverse drug reactions cause more than *389 100,000 deaths 
annually in the U.S.--meaning that more people in the U.S. die from legal use of prescription medications 
than from automobile accidents. [FN122] Medicine remains much more art than science: 
Even today, with a high-tech health-care system that costs the nation $2 trillion a year, there is little or 
no evidence that many widely used treatments and procedures actually work better than various 
cheaper alternatives. 
. . . . 
. . . And while there has been progress in recent years, most of these physicians say the portion of 
medicine that has been proven effective is still outrageously low--in the range of 20% to 25%. [FN123] 
 
B. Today's Drug Research and Development Potential 
Drug development has changed fundamentally. [FN124] The legacies of discretion to commercial 
sponsors over the content of clinical research and to the medical community over off-label use are 
prevalent today, but the science of drug development has evolved and is undergoing a genomics 
(genetic expression) metamorphosis--a “genomics revolution.” [FN125] The prevalence of 
“biopharmaceuticals” in the drug development pipeline and the centralized review of all new drugs, 
whether based primarily in biology or chemistry, within the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research 
(CDER) beginning in 2004 [FN126] confirm that pharmaceutical R&D and biotech have integrated 
extensively. [FN127] 
*390 The potential of ongoing drug development, with a map of the human genome in hand [FN128] 
and the creation of more profound tools underway, [FN129] arguably is limited only by human ingenuity 
given increasing abilities to manipulate the “highly sophisticated, delicate regulatory pathways and *391 
feedback loops” [FN130] of drug targets through the precision of genetics and identification of 
environmental influences. [FN131] Today holds the promise of infiltrating disease pathways on the 
cellular, genetic, and molecular levels to treat the causes of disease and thereby improve human health 
well beyond existing capabilities. [FN132] 
The completion of the human genome map in 2003 made it possible to identify an individual's genetic 
makeup to determine disease risk, and a patient's likely response to certain medications. Genetic 
information may be used to diagnose a condition in an individual prenatally or prior to the presentation 
of any clinical symptoms. [FN133] 
Millions of associations have been made between genetic variations and human health, and each 
constitutes a potential drug target. [FN134] Increasingly, discussion of a forthcoming era of personalized 
medicine--engineering medications tailored to individual patient's genetic makeup (pharmacogenetics, 
developed through pharmacogenomics) [FN135]--and extensive genetic profiling as part of both 
preventive care and treatment carries a tone of “when” rather than “if.” [FN136] Overall, there is 
considerable consensus that “the availability of the *392 human genome sequence, together with the 
pharmacogenomic and pharmacogenetic approaches to developing new drug therapies, has and will 
continue to contribute to a better selection and faster development of safer and more effective 
diagnostics and treatments.” [FN137] Affirmations of the health care potential of contemporary 
biopharmaceutical R&D include Herceptin, [FN138] Gleevec, [FN139] and Olaparib. [FN140] 
 
C. Drug Disappointments and Desperation 
Unfortunately, the present reality is that drug development lingers between the scientifically crude, yet 
enormously profitable pharmaceutical past and the biopharmaceutical present and future. [FN141] “Ten 
years after President Bill Clinton announced that the first draft of the human genome was complete, 
medicine has yet to see any large part of the promised benefits.” [FN142] The transition could take 
many years--decades according to some commentators. [FN143] In recent years, drug development 
disappointments have vastly outnumbered successes in spite of tremendous investment. [FN144] 
According to the pharmaceutical industry's trade organization, the Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America (“PhRMA”), “In 2009, America's pharmaceutical research and biotechnology 
companies continued to make the *393 world's largest investment in pharmaceutical R&D, holding 
steady with $65.3 billion spent on R&D, including $45.8 billion by PhRMA members alone.” [FN145] 
Nevertheless, new drug approvals fell to a twenty-five year low in 2007, just eighteen, followed by a 
slight bump to twenty-four in 2008 and twenty-six in 2009. [FN146] In 2010, Pfizer Inc., the world's 
largest research-based pharmaceutical company, did not produce a single new drug approval. [FN147] In 
comparison, new drug approvals peaked in 1996 when the FDA approved fifty-three. [FN148] According 
to Dr. Francis Collins, Director of the National Institutes of Health, this decline in productivity over the 
past fifteen years “certainly doesn't show any signs of turning upward.” [FN149] In fact, the federal 
government has become concerned enough about the performance of the commercial 
biopharmaceutical sectors to start a “billion-dollar government drug development center to help create 
new medicines.” [FN150] Industry continues to spend enormous amounts of money to make new drugs. 
[FN151] 
The drop in new drug approvals has taken place in spite of annual governmental investments of billions 
of dollars in biomedical research and a substantial increase in commercial investment in 
biopharmaceutical R&D. “Before 1980, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) funded most medical 
research. . . . Today, drug and medical device companies fund up to 80% to 90% of all clinical trials; in 
2005, industry invested 78% more in research and development than did the federal government.” 
[FN152] Though the trend is to export clinical research beyond the U.S. borders and to outsource it to 
CROs, [FN153] the amount of clinical research undertaken today within the United States is 
unprecedented-- an almost fifty percent increase during the first half of this decade. [FN154] Phase III 
trials have expanded to 20,000 subjects from just *394 3,000 five years ago, which has doubled their 
cost--now typically $50-100 million. [FN155] 
In addition to the decline in new drug approvals, many of the prescription drugs the FDA has put on the 
market in recent years have proven disappointing. There is ample reason to question their quality and 
the Agency's performance overseeing them. [FN156] Most notably, Vioxx has become a “scarlet letter” 
the FDA is likely to wear for years to come, [FN157] and many additional prescription drug problems 
have followed in recent years. In the fall of 2010, the FDA itself “concluded that in some cases two types 
of drugs that were supposed to be preventing serious medical problems were, in fact, causing them.” 
[FN158] These were Avandia, prescribed heavily to treat type-2 diabetes, and bisphosphonates--an 
active agent in the prescription drugs Fosamax, Actonel, and Boniva--used widely to prevent fractures 
common in people with osteoporosis. [FN159] Avandia was associated with an increased risk of heart 
attacks and strokes, a major problem for its target patient group given two thirds of diabetics die of 
heart problems, [FN160] and bisphosphonates was *395 determined to actually cause fractures of the 
thigh bone and degeneration of the jawbone. [FN161] In addition, a whole generation of teenagers with 
severe acne was treated with Accutane, on the market in 1982, which now is associated with 
inflammatory bowel disease, ulcerative colitis, Crohn's disease, other gastrointestinal disorders, liver 
damage, birth defects, and suicidal thoughts. [FN162] Roche, the manufacturer, pulled Accutane from 
the market on June 29, 2009. [FN163] Many commercial drug developers and their supporters blame 
the FDA for the drop-off in new drug approvals, claiming the FDA has been too strict. [FN164] Others 
attribute the fall to an industry that is clinging to the low science and regulatory standards of the past, 
stretching the commercial lives of pharmaceuticals through manipulation of the patent system, and 
contriving “me too” drugs rather than engaging in genuine innovation. [FN165] When the Vioxx 
controversy substantiated doubts about the FDA's reliability in regulating the biopharmaceutical market, 
[FN166] the Agency responded by raising *396 its level of scrutiny, which has generated substantial drug 
sponsor demand for specialized toxicology studies by CROs. [FN167] In fact, Vioxx and related concerns 
about FDA effectiveness inspired inquiry and generated corroborating reports on deficiencies from the 
Government Accountability Office (“GAO”), the Institutes of Medicine (“IOM”), and congressional 
hearings. [FN168] These *397 questions about the sufficiency of drug regulation and overall agency 
performance prompted FDA Commissioner Margaret Hamburg, when newly appointed, to establish a 
task force with the mission of developing recommendations to increase transparency of the Agency's 
activities and decision-making. [FN169] 
Avandia illustrates a trend that accompanied modernization of the Agency through the FDAMA: 
conditional market access with reliance upon post-marketing studies for safety and efficacy assurances. 
[FN170] With the introduction of user fees under the PDUFA [FN171] and modernization through 
FDAMA, [FN172] the Agency has approved drugs based upon surrogate endpoints-- indications that the 
drug performs, rather than definitive proof--and conditioned upon follow-on clinical studies. [FN173] 
Sixty-four drugs reached the market conditionally between 1992 and 2008. [FN174] According to the 
GAO, the FDA has allowed drugs to stay on the market even when follow-up studies showed they did 
not save lives. [FN175] Although more than one-third of these conditional studies are pending, the FDA 
never has pulled a drug from the market because of a failure to do required follow-up about actual 
benefits--even when the information is *398 more than a decade overdue. [FN176] This failure is 
consistent with GAO and IOM declarations that the FDA's performance post drug approval is 
substandard. [FN177] 
The very integrity of contemporary drug science has been called into question. Arguably, “government 
interventions are necessary to protect and preserve the public nature of science, which is essential to 
shore up the contemporary science enterprise.” [FN178] Aggressive integration of academia and 
industry has created a proliferation of conflicts of interest, and the public nature of science--collegiality, 
communication, transparency, and accountability--has shifted in the direction of secrecy. [FN179] In the 
words of one observer, “It has turned universities into commercial entities, created a multibillion-dollar 
industry of technology transfer, and subsidized virtually every biotechnology company and discovery of 
the past twenty-five years.” [FN180] The science publications depended upon for scrutiny, 
accountability, and human health assessment have also embraced commercialization--evident by 
conflicts of interest controversies and the journals' imposition of high cost barriers to access their 
publications: [FN181] 
*399 The vast capacity to publish research and to share knowledge is tainted by conflicts of interest 
which threaten the reliability and integrity of the peer review process and, consequently, the underlying 
research. Governments, professional societies, and most science journals have failed to introduce and 
enforce the mechanisms necessary to manage conflicts of interest in an era of aggressive 
commercialization with meaningful confidence. 
Also, industry has directly increased its influence over government and the general public substantially 
over the last few decades. [FN182] PDUFA legislation, [FN183] direct interface between industry and the 
broader government through extensive lobbying, [FN184] and direct communication with the general 
public through billions of dollars invested in marketing annually have raised concerns and inspired calls 
for more regulation. [FN185] 
 
III. Law-Policy Alchemy: A Proposal to Change the Science Standard in Human Clinical Research from 
Gold to Platinum 
 
The FDA science standard for drug approval and the law-policy implementing it are, at best, dangerously 
dated--to the detriment of drug development, the practice of medicine, and human health. [FN186] 
Nevertheless, the commercial interests vested in new drug development, domestic and international, 
are too influential and too wedded to GD for an expansive break from the past to be a realistic 
possibility in the foreseeable future. [FN187] Under PDUFA, which generates the salaries of more than 
900 FDA reviewers through the collection of user fees, industry has tremendous ongoing negotiation 
leverage given the inclusion of five-year sunset provisions in each PDUFA renewal coupled with two 
decades of FDA financial dependence for a considerable portion of its new drug review operating 
budget. [FN188] 
Arguably, wholly uprooting the entrenched science standard, even if this were a viable option, would 
not be desirable given the approximately fifteen-*400 year timeline to develop each innovative new 
drug and the transitional nature of ongoing science in the drug development pipeline. [FN189] Such a 
major change, especially if forced through law-policy that imposes more clinical trial obligations, could 
chill investment in pharmaceutical R&D, which is sorely needed during this time of historically high drug 
development costs, product disappointments, and economic challenges that extend well beyond the 
biopharmaceutical sectors. [FN190] 
Although drug development is evolving in the direction of precision through genomics (genetic 
expression), [FN191] proteomics (protein expression), [FN192] and related fields, overall, the endeavor 
still remains too crude to adopt SSRD as a substitute for traditional GD. [FN193] As observed by the 
FDA's Janet Woodcock, an agency leader under several presidential administrations, both Democratic 
and Republican, “At this time, medical practice is predicated on observation. For example, we still 
collectively categorize lung cancer as we did one hundred years ago. We still are not sophisticated. We 
don't know what the actual molecular cause of that particular cancer is in that particular person because 
we don't look for it.” [FN194] However, the biopharmaceutical sectors certainly have the resources and 
capabilities to rise to the occasion of a higher standard in clinical research than traditional GD. [FN195] 
*401 A meaningful, pragmatic transition is needed: SSRD should be introduced as a complement or 
nested research methodology to GD to shift more meaningful understanding of pharmaceuticals from 
clinical care (the delivery of health care to patients) to clinical research; to lessen experimentation on 
patients in the delivery of their care through physician off-label use, which is removed from regulations 
to protect human subjects; [FN196] and to infuse responsiveness to the increasing precision enabled in 
both drug development and the delivery of care by contemporary genetic science. [FN197] “For 
biomedical *402 researchers, the best course for increasing scientific understanding of relevant 
phenomena revolves around the utilization of a variety of methodological designs, with the research 
question of interest determining the choice of the design.” [FN198] Although meaningful SSRD data 
could complicate GD trials and lengthen the drug approval process, understanding pharmaceuticals 
much more before they reach the market is sorely needed. [FN199] Moreover, it is a cost that could be 
contained through incremental implementation and potentially offset through a reduction in the lost 
opportunities attributable to drug underdevelopment. Although SSRD presumably would narrow the 
existing opportunity to oversell by making new drugs more thoroughly understood prior to their market 
entry, the extra data could raise the presently waning confidence of providers and patients--a “one-two 
punch” of science. From a regulatory perspective, infusing more specificity into the product approval 
process, knowing much more about pharmaceuticals prior to putting them on the market, and, 
consequently, restricting the familiar level of off-label use are desirable and needed--and demanded 
increasingly by government policy makers and the general public. [FN200] 
The following discussion establishes the potential of SSRD to improve drug development and health care 
delivery, with emphasis on the practicality and feasibility of incorporating SSRD into human clinical 
research. After identifying law-policy options, the Article emphasizes the use of positive commercial 
incentives based upon enacted legislation that has succeeded in getting desired human clinical trial 
research undertaken by industry--namely the BPCA and the ODA, each of which is addressed in the 
following discussion. 
 
A. SSRD's Potential to Improve Drug Development and Delivery 
Wait-and-see dependence on the medical profession to sort out the impact of prescription medications 
on individuals, one patient at a time, in a trial-and-error manner, “exposes patients to potentially 
harmful drug interactions and *403 delays potentially effective or the ‘right’ treatment.” [FN201] As 
recognized by Dr. Janosky, an expert in SSRD, there is a strong parallel between SSRD and the actual 
delivery of health care: 
In a primary care setting, the patient generally exhibits symptoms and the physician follows evidence-
based or appropriate steps to treat these symptoms. The physician evaluates the patient's history, signs, 
symptoms, medical test results, and examines the patient, and subsequently implements a treatment or 
intervention if warranted. . . . In primary care settings, standardized procedures are employed that 
include objective measurement of the outcomes, such as systolic blood pressure measurements. These 
design and intervention procedures are analogous to the standardized procedures used in single subject 
research designs, such as testing the effectiveness of a medication over a course of time. [FN202] 
SSRD, the very nature of which is close scrutiny of each of the individuals under study, [FN203] could 
improve decision-making during the clinical trial process and actually increase flexibility in clinical 
research for drug development because it presents an opportunity to tailor interventions for specific 
subjects and to modify ineffective ones over the course of the period of study. [FN204] A major practical 
advantage of SSRD over GD is that “[i]t overcomes some of the inherent limitations found in large-scale 
clinical trials, in that treatments are tailored for unique individuals and can also be modified over time.” 
[FN205] SSRD data could better enable sponsor decision-making for its GD counterpart, thereby saving 
them from investing hundreds of millions of dollars in the development and marketing of products like 
Vioxx, Avandia, and Accutane, each of which has exposed their manufacturers to substantial product 
liability and class action lawsuits. [FN206] By addressing human variability through SSRD, drug sponsors 
could cut back significantly on the time and expense of human clinical trials that are required to put new 
drugs on the market, both of which have risen significantly in recent years. [FN207] Moreover, there is 
an obvious ethics advantage in that many SSRD designs ensure that *404 each individual receives the 
treatment(s) and does not require denying patients access to potential treatments to create a control--a 
standard component of GD. [FN208] SSRD could even enable research not practicable under GD. 
[FN209] As explained by Professor Janosky, 
Specifically, at times it is difficult to find a large number of patients who have unique demographics or 
suffer from rare diseases. Furthermore, large N studies can be time consuming. One of the 
consequences of the time consuming nature of large N research is the difficulty in studying public health 
crises, for example. Additionally, the exorbitant financial costs of large-sample research often limit who 
is able to conduct such projects, at times risking an ethical dilemma with the linking of the researcher 
and the funder in mutual vested interests in the results. For example, funding from pharmaceutical 
companies is often needed to conduct the multi-million dollar research necessary for evaluating the 
same drugs those companies produce. [FN210] 
SSRD, with its emphasis on responsiveness to human variability, offers an opportunity to identify genetic 
markers and to develop meaningful biomarker screens during the human clinical trial process. 
Specifically, SSRD introduces an opportunity to use the clinical trial process to develop a bouquet of 
sophisticated genetic screens--for example, genetic tests that stratify patients in the trials to discern 
those most prone to responsiveness and those at higher risk for adverse events, and perfecting drug 
dosage on a person-by-person basis. [FN211] Genetic differences impact responses to pharmaceuticals, 
and at times do so profoundly. [FN212] Studies establish that enzyme variations in genes, with thirty or 
more enzymes typically coded for each gene, may have a profound impact on the rate that they are 
metabolized--a major consideration for what constitutes safe and effective dosing for individual 
patients. [FN213] A noted illustration is the wide variation in patient reactions to asthma medications, 
*405 some of which studies have attributed to identified differences in genetic makeup. [FN214] 
 
B. The Feasibility of SSRD in Drug Development--Precedent and Practice 
Several trends suggest that drug sponsors should expect more scrutiny and demands for accountability 
from regulators, the medical community, and the general public: rising health care finance pressures, 
federal and state, domestic and international; increased transparency of market performance and 
market behavior through internet communication, including organized observation through patient and 
consumer protection groups; and pressure on the FDA to increase post-marketing regulation 
requirements and general enforcement. [FN215] SSRD could prove a means to meet and quell these 
pressures, and implementation is practicable: there is precedent for the use of SSRD in human clinical 
research to advance health care, albeit almost entirely outside of the context of biopharmaceutical 
development. [FN216] 
Extensive SSRD human clinical research has been done in applied behavior analysis and education, 
[FN217] and “[n]umerous studies have highlighted the importance of the single subject design paradigm 
in primary care.” [FN218] Some especially notable disease-related group accomplishments utilizing SSRD 
include a large portion of the research studying treatments for aphasic patients (loss of the ability to 
articulate ideas or comprehend language due to brain damage from injury or disease), attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”), and diabetes. [FN219] Many SSRD studies in the primary care setting 
have been premised upon raising the predictability of responsiveness to stimulant medications at 
various dosages, including an ambitious collective assessment study carried out in Australia more than 
two decades ago. As summarized by Professor Janosky, 
[I]n the 1980s, McMaster University designed a service for community and academic physicians to 
facilitate the planning and conduction of single subject (N-of-1) trials. The effectiveness of the trials was 
evaluated by the physicians' management plans and confidence levels in the plans both prior to and 
following trials. A total of 57 single subject trials were completed, with 50 trials providing a definite 
clinical answer and 15 resulting in the physician *406 altering patient treatment. In those 15 trials 
resulting in treatment adjustment, 11 trials lead to physicians discontinuing the medication therapy they 
planned to administer indefinitely. Trials that were not completed generally stemmed from patient' or 
physician' noncompliance or patient' concurrent illness [sic]. 
Based upon these results reported by the collaborative team at McMaster University, single subject 
trials afford important opportunities for application in biomedicine, including directly improving patient 
clinical care. [FN221] 
SSRD experience in human clinical trials and in the primary care context over decades could be infused 
into drug development readily, creatively, and with flexibility, as demonstrated by Professor Gina Green: 
Unlike between-groups studies, single-case studies can be conducted in typical service settings like 
schools, treatment centers, hospitals clinics, and homes. Their focus on the development of individual 
behavior and their flexibility makes these methods especially well-suited for studying treatments for 
[autism spectrum disorders], given the large individual differences among people with those diagnoses. 
Single-case research methods also afford a means for practitioners as well as researchers to evaluate 
the effects of many types of treatments--behavioral, educational, medical, or combinations--with 
scientific rigor. [FN222] 
A report issued by the IOM in 2001, which provided initial guidelines for small clinical trials, is an 
affirmation of the feasibility and potential utility of SSRD in drug development. [FN223] The report 
recognized the potential utility of these trials for a portfolio of situations, including rare diseases, unique 
study populations, individually tailored therapies, isolated environments (for example, health care in 
rural areas), emergency situations, and public health urgency. [FN224] 
An SSRD component to clinical trials for drug development would introduce several potential benefits, in 
addition to raising fundamental understanding about new drugs during the pre-market clinical research 
stage. The size and costs of GD trials have increased immensely in concert with the proliferation of the 
genetic sciences and associated precision--which by its very nature demands increased attention to 
human variability. [FN225] The GD approach is demonstrating decision-making confusion and clinical 
trial *407 failures. [FN226] As observed in an April 2010 report issued by the Institute of Medicine, 
approximately forty percent of all advanced clinical trials sponsored by the National Cancer Institute, 
organized under the GD gold standard for the most part, are never completed--resulting in a waste of 
money, effort, and lost opportunities to improve human health and reap financial returns. [FN227] 
An obvious primary question for implementation of SSRD is, given industry's entrenched commitment to 
GD, how to use SSRD and GD together in drug development. Johnston and Pennypacker, authors of a 
heavily-cited text on behavioral research that compares and contrasts SSRD and GD, propose that, 
where both are used, SSRD should be utilized to graph and check data for each subject as a quality 
control on GD reliance on inferential statistical techniques and interpretation to generate and explain 
data. [FN228] In fact, they believe that all data should be subjected to SSRD scrutiny before it even is 
eligible for use in GD. [FN229] Their primary concern is that group data risks obscuring individual 
patterns of responding: 
[T]he more an analytical procedure changes the investigator's picture of the subject's behavior as it 
actually happened, the greater the risk that the analytical procedure may exert more control over 
interpretations than do the data. . . . 
A related guideline may be stated as follows: The more an investigator has to change the data to see 
something important, the greater the risk that the result is not that important or, perhaps, not even 
there. [FN230] 
To begin the transition into utilization of SSRD in biopharmaceutical R&D, [FN231] one option is to 
pursue running SSRD and GD trials in parallel and throughout Phases I-III of the pre-market human 
clinical trial process. [FN232] Incorporating the Johnston and Pennypacker approach, SSRD trials could 
be started in advance and used to shape GD trials, and then as a quality control *408 throughout their 
duration. [FN233] Another possible approach would be to use SSRD more intensely in a focused 
capacity--perhaps for specific trials, specific patient subpopulations, or for specific treatments, such as 
those for rare patient populations in conjunction with the Orphan Drug Act. [FN234] Specifically, “single 
subject designs may be nested within larger clinical trials to increase compliance and answer more 
detailed questions. Single subject designs are particularly useful for answering questions regarding rare 
diseases, side effects, unique populations, emergency situations, and isolated environments, in which 
between-group designs would be unfeasible or impractical.” [FN235] 
Another option, and one that could be applied in conjunction with the others, would be to introduce 
SSRD services to assist physicians with market use of prescription drugs as an extension of Phase IV 
trials--an application strongly supported by the McMaster University study and ample primary care 
applications. [FN236] In summary, 
Research supports the effectiveness of the single subject design, from studying treatments for rare 
patient populations to providing N-of-1 trial services in assisting physicians. The single subject design is 
an innovative addition to the arsenal of available methodologies for primary care physicians, biomedical 
students, residents, medical research faculty, clinical practitioners, among others. Consistent with the 
NIH Roadmap Initiative, increasing awareness of the utility in the single subject design could enhance 
treatment approach and evaluation both in biomedical research and primary care settings. [FN237] 
 
*409 C. Law-Policy Catalysts to Turn Gold into Platinum 
Although “there is substantial proof that the current method of creating medicines for the general 
public is problematic and could prevent effective treatments from reaching the marketplace” , [FN238] 
voluntary uptake of SSRD by drug developers is unlikely. They are inclined to resist the official addition 
of SSRD into the regulatory process for the same reason they have been slow to introduce 
pharmacogenomics data (R&D based upon genetic expression [FN239]) in their applications in spite of 
FDA encouragement--fear that it will be used against them to limit their market reach. The FDA has 
issued voluntary guidelines to promote submission of pharmacogenomics data which, in sync with SSRD, 
innately involves closer individual patient scrutiny--including at the genetic and molecular levels--and 
more extensive patient-centered data compilation during the clinical trial process. [FN240] 
Unfortunately, the guidelines *410 have not overcome industry fear that genetic specification will break 
down disease groups and restrict market reach through narrower approvals, more defined product 
labels, reimbursement limitations, and less physician discretion to use these pharmaceuticals off label. 
As explained by Dr. Woodcock, 
The primary policy problem right now is that most of these genetic tests are not being evaluated in 
clinical studies, and they are not being seen by the regulatory agencies. Application in the official drug 
development regulatory process is stymied by concern about how these tests will be used by the 
marketing application reviewers. This could present a real lost opportunity for any person who wants to 
take medicine in the foreseeable future. [FN241] 
Even when pharmacogenomics data make it onto drug labels, [FN242] the underlying sponsor data 
released is limited, and the medical community often lacks the knowledge to make efficient use of it. 
[FN243] 
A thoughtful law-policy intervention beyond voluntary guidelines is essential to add a meaningful SSRD 
component to drug development. Using the regulatory process to attempt to impose commercial uses 
on new drug candidates or specific types of human clinical trials on drug developers would invite 
allegations of undue impediment on the commercial freedom that is the touchstone of our private 
market system and introduce susceptibility to legal *411 challenges. [FN244] The drug development 
regulatory regime embodies deference to commercial free speech, proprietary interests, profit 
incentives, and the discretion to practice medicine--as the FDA has been reminded by Congress and 
through several legal challenges during the genomics revolution. For example, the House Report that 
accompanied FDAMA expressly states that “the FDA has no authority to regulate how physicians 
prescribe approved drugs in the context of their medical practice. Physicians prescribing off-label uses of 
approved drugs is not within the jurisdiction of the FDA.” [FN245] As for legal challenges, in 2000 the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia dismissed a challenge to FDAMA provisions addressing 
manufacturer promotion of off-label use that claimed the provisions imposed an undue burden on 
commercial free speech in violation of the First Amendment. [FN246] However, the Court based its 
decision on the fact that the parties reached agreement that there was no longer an issue after the FDA 
changed its stance. [FN247] 
Perhaps the most vivid recent illustration of the limits of agency authority to force studies on drug 
sponsors is the FDA's attempt to fill the vacuum of pediatric studies for pharmaceuticals known to be 
prescribed to children. [FN248] In *412 fact, even today, pediatric data is insufficient, at times wholly 
lacking, for two-thirds of prescription drugs. [FN249] A 1994 study reported that six of the ten drugs 
most commonly prescribed to children had inadequate pediatric labeling, [FN250] which inspired the 
FDA to issue a rule and to introduce a voluntary, incentive-based program to promote pediatric testing 
and labeling. [FN251] The tone during this time, under David Kessler who was the FDA Commissioner 
from 1990 to 1997, was administrative caution: 
I need to acknowledge the limits of FDA's authority. It is our job to review drug applications for the 
indications suggested by the manufacturer. We do not have the authority to require manufacturers to 
seek approval for indications which they have not studied. Thus, as a matter of law, if an application 
contains indications only for adults, we're stuck. 
To address this dearth of pediatric data even for drugs prescribed to children routinely, Congress 
codified a voluntary, incentive-based five-year program through a pediatric exclusivity provision in 
FDAMA. [FN253] This program granted drug manufacturers six months of market exclusivity for their 
products--as opposed to just extending intellectual property rights--as an incentive for conducting 
pediatric studies. [FN254] The FDA then went further and issued a “Pediatric Rule” in 1998 that 
mandated pediatric testing-- both for drug candidates and those already approved for market use. 
[FN255] The FDA was *413 sued successfully under the Administrative Procedure Act [FN256] with 
claims that promulgation of the Pediatric Rule was arbitrary and capricious and exceeded the FDA's 
authority. [FN257] The voluntary program worked but was only moderately successful. As of April 2001, 
the FDA had issued a mere 188 written requests covering 155 drugs already on the market and just 
thirty-three new drugs not yet approved. [FN258] “As of April 1, 2001, only 28 drugs had been granted 
periods of exclusivity.” [FN259] Most of these drugs did experience a labeling change of some degree to 
address pediatrics, but, according to an article published in 2001, only 37.5 percent constituted a 
significant change in safety or dosing. [FN260] By discussions in 2001 to reauthorize the voluntary 
program, only twenty-five percent of drugs had been studied in children--just a five percent increase 
from the 1994 statistic. [FN261] 
While the litigation against the FDA rule was pending and the FDAMA voluntary program approached its 
January 1, 2002, sunset, [FN262] Congress intervened with the Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act. 
[FN263] BPCA reinstated the FDAMA voluntary program for pediatric testing with the incentive of six 
months of market exclusivity and then went further by empowering the FDA to step over manufacturer 
resistance and get pediatric trials done by third parties through the National Institutes of Health or with 
funding from a federal trust. [FN264] BPCA also provided a basis to strike the FDA's Pediatric Rule. 
[FN265] Regarding the BPCA's effectiveness, critics have *414 pointed out that the BPCA approach 
shifted considerable drug development cost from manufacturers to taxpayers. [FN266] Nevertheless, as 
of March 2004, pharmaceutical manufacturers had issued 346 requests to evaluate prescription drugs 
for pediatric use, ninety-seven drugs were granted six months of exclusivity, and new labels were 
approved for seventy. [FN267] As of 2008, 145 drugs had been issued exclusivity. [FN268] 
Another illustration of the success of Congress and the FDA to utilize positive commercial incentives to 
get desired clinical research undertaken in drug development is the Orphan Drug Act. ODA is a rewards-
based program that makes it commercially viable to develop drugs for small groups of patients through 
tax incentives, a seven-year period of market exclusivity, and other benefits. [FN269] The targeted 
research is being done: some 350 orphan drugs have been approved in the U.S. market alone, and the 
program has been replicated by other countries. [FN270] Orphan drug filings have increased, especially 
submissions from multinational pharmaceutical sponsors. There is considerable overlap between the 
ODA methodology and suggestions from NIH and others to incorporate small clinical trials and SSRD into 
drug development with an initial focus on small, discernible patient groups. 
The effectiveness of commercial incentives to get desired clinical research done has been demonstrated 
through ODA and BPCA, as has the *415 ineffectiveness of soft incentives such as voluntary guidelines 
and the susceptibility of FDA mandates to legal challenge. To implement SSRD into drug development as 
quickly, effectively, and pragmatically as possible, Congress and the FDA should build upon what has 
worked and an opportunity introduced by a new government initiative--introduction of a federal 
research center with the specific mission of helping industry overcome drug development difficulties. 
Given the commonality between ODA--small, distinguishable disease groups--and SSRD, ODA should be 
modified to favor utilization of SSRD in program qualification and provide additional incentives for its 
use, including additional tax incentives, additional reviewer support and responsiveness, and an 
additional extension (at least one year, to make the total exclusivity eight years) of market exclusivity for 
approved products that complete SSRD studies. The FDA would have the discretion, as it does with the 
base ODA program, to set criteria and determine eligibility--meaning the Agency could experiment with 
SSRD to assess its efficacy in varied applications. 
For drug development beyond the small disease groups that qualify for ODA status, Congress and the 
FDA should draw heavily from BPCA--perhaps in a manner that, in addition to promoting SSRD overall, 
particularly favors use of SSRD in pediatric studies and studies of other distinguishable patient and 
disease groups to make up for the relative dearth of data over the years. This approach would be closely 
consistent with the suggestions of SSRD experts in disciplines that have embraced the approach, 
including professors Green, Janosky, Johnston, and Pennypacker. [FN271] SSRD studies should be 
solicited with the incentive of at least six months of additional market exclusivity for resulting products 
(pediatric studies with SSRD would be rewarded with a year or more of product exclusivity), and 
Congress should create a separate trust fund to enable the FDA to undertake these studies when 
industry sponsors refuse. The fund should be established to direct the FDA to include post-marketing 
(Phase IV) studies with primary care physicians on both new and existing drugs to assist physicians with 
market use--along the lines of the McMaster University study and suggestions of Dr. Janosky. [FN272] 
Both the IOM and GAO have determined that the FDA does a grossly insufficient job once 
pharmaceuticals reach the market and recent experience with the disappointment of approved drugs 
confirms, suggesting that SSRD studies, consistent with the practice of medicine, could make a 
substantial contribution. [FN273] An SSRD fund would impose a cost on taxpayers--a major *416 
criticism of BPCA. [FN274] Nevertheless, the state of drug development, new drug disappointments, the 
potential of SSRD coupled with genetic precision to improve drug development and benefit health care, 
the need to lessen dependence on years of physician off-label use for meaningful understanding of new 
drugs, consumption of government regulatory resources for this disappointing return, and lost product 
opportunities for sectors that are a major presence in our economy suggest that taxpayer investment in 
such a fund would be more than justified--especially given the amount of funding taken from industry in 
user fees to cover FDA operations. The federal government appears to have recognized as much through 
establishment of a billion dollar center to help industry create new drugs, headed by Dr. Francis Collins 
who led the U.S. government HGP effort and now is Director of NIH. [FN275] 
This center to assist drug development also should make SSRD a priority. Although the Center is focused 
primarily on basic research--for example, to use its state-of-the-art robotic screening capabilities to 
identify chemicals that influence enzymes--and animal studies, its mission also includes starting human 
trials. [FN276] The center should broaden its clinical research vision and include SSRD. The transition 
into clinical research in drug development involves a substantial increase of industry investment--
money, research, and opportunity. Contingent upon the outcome of research, investment correlates 
with industry commitment--meaning an inclination to want to work with the center to resurrect 
troubled drug development efforts that hold market potential. The center, preferably working in 
conjunction with the FDA, could infuse SSRD to salvage developed drug R&D undertakings representing 
substantial time and research investments and financial investments of tens, if not hundreds, of millions 
of dollars. The Center's involvement in just Phase I trials could make significant contributions. [FN277] 
 
Conclusion 
 
The so-called gold standard for human clinical research in drug development, GD, no longer glitters--to 
the extent it ever really did. The costs of relying too heavily on GD are self-evident, including a 
significant decline in new drug approvals in spite of historic investment and resources such as the map 
of the human genome, drug disappointments such as Vioxx and Avandia that have threatened the lives 
of the patients taking them and generated large *417 class action law suits, and dwindling faith in the 
FDA as evident in the passage of the FDAAA in 2007 as well as the GAO and IOM reports issued in 2006. 
[FN278] 
The crude science past in drug development, which may have justified reliance on GD, no longer should 
control the genetics present and future of human clinical research in biopharmaceutical R&D and FDA 
market approval. Genetics is increasingly dominating the drug development pipeline, and the very 
nature of genomics is unprecedented scientific precision--working at the cellular, genetic, and molecular 
levels in living organisms to identify genetic expression, to reveal the origins and progression of disease, 
and to make connections between the two and develop drugs based upon those connections. [FN279] 
Regulatory reform is needed to make the science standard for human clinical trials responsive to the 
significance of human individuality and variability--factors recognized innately in both genomics and the 
patient-centered practice of medicine. 
This Article has proposed law-policy reforms to infuse an alternative science methodology into human 
clinical research for drug development--SSRD. SSRD shares the responsiveness of genetics-based R&D to 
the reality of individual human variability, and an SSRD complement to GD could prove a means to move 
drug development through its present state of puberty between the crude science past and genetics-
based future. [FN280] “The single subject design has been successful in illuminating research findings 
across a variety of disciplines. It overcomes some of the inherent limitations found in large-scale clinical 
trials, in that treatments are tailored for unique individuals and can also be modified over time.” [FN281] 
The proposals to promote SSRD put forth in this Article are based upon commercial incentives and 
programs that have endured the threat of legal challenges--the ODA and the BPCA. [FN282] The FDA has 
successfully used ODA and BPCA to get needed clinical research done on small disease groups and 
children that industry had avoided. This Article also proposes to infuse SSRD into human clinical research 
through a billion-dollar government center recently established to help industry create new drugs. 
[FN283] The objective, as expressed by NIH Director Francis Collins who will direct the center and 
headed the U.S. government's effort to map the human genome, is to convert contemporary genetic 
science accomplishments into clinical applications that *418 improve human health and move industry 
out of its fifteen year slump in new drug approvals. [FN284] 
The biopharmaceutical sectors have the resources and capabilities to meet a higher science standard in 
clinical research than GD--a standard that has resulted in ongoing drug underdevelopment. [FN285] 
SSRD is an opportunity to introduce a gold standard that actually glitters in an age of genomics and shifts 
drug development in the direction of needed improvements to human health. 
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biopharmaceuticals, despite recent advances in biomedical research, as well as potential solutions); 
Bitter Medicine: Pills, Profit, and the Public Health (ABC News television broadcast May 29, 2002). 
 
[FN142]. Nicholas Wade, A Decade Later, Gene Map Yields Few New Cures, N.Y. Times, June 13, 2010, at 
A1. 
 
[FN143]. See Patient-Tailored Medicine Part One, supra note 13, at 35. 
 
[FN144]. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text. 
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is advancing testing in oncology through The Cancer Genome Atlas, a project to map gene variations 
that cause cancer, spur its growth, and cause therapeutic resistance. Id. 
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